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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JOHN R. RASCON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 870518-CA 
Priority 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
I 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Is the use of dental cream a "foreign substance" within 
the meaning of State v. Baker disqualifying the intoxilyzer 
results as a matter of law? 
2. Was there adequate foundation to admit Appellant-
Rascon's expert opinion regarding the effect of the alleged use 
of dental cream by this appellant upon the intoxilyzer test? 
3. Even if the intoxilyzer test results were inadmissible, 
was it harmless error to admit the test results under the 
undisputed facts of this case? 
4. Does the failure of Appellant-Rascon to submit written 
findings and an order following a pretrial suppression hearing, 
combined with his failure to renew the motion or otherwise make 
any reference at trial to the prior ruling, constitute a waiver 
of his right to appeal a denial of a pretrial motion to suppress? 
II 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of Driving Under the 
Influence of Alcohol, a Class B misdemeanor, following a jury 
trial in the Fifth Circuit Court of Utah, Salt Lake Department, 
the Honorable Maurice D. Jones presiding. 
Ill 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Appellant-Rascon was convicted by a jury in the Fifth 
Circuit Court of violating a City ordinance prohibiting operating 
a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Appellant 
now seeks relief from the Utah Court of Appeals, claiming that 
the denial of his pretrial motion to suppress justifies reversal 
of the conviction, 
IV 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURTS 
Appellant-Radeon was convicted by a jury in the Fifth 
Circuit Court. Tfte Fifth Circuit Court declined to issue a 
certificate of probable cause. 
V 
The facts, wften viewed in a light favorable to upholding the 
jury verdict, demonstrate the following. 
1. On June 30, 1987 at approximately 1:45 a.m. the 
arresting officer observed the Appellant-Rascon walking west on 
Fourth South Street near State Street. Appellant-Rascon was 
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staggering as he walked up to his car, and he fumbled around with 
his keys trying to enter the vehicle. (Tr-25). 
2. After Appellant-Rascon entered the vehicle he drove in 
a westerly direction on 400 South in an erratic fashion. He 
repeatedly crossed over the lane line into the other lane of 
traffic and accelerated very rapidly between semaphore lights 
reaching speeds of up to 40 m.p.h., although the speed limit was 
30 m.p.h. After following for two blocks, the officer pulled the 
vehicle over for an illegal lane change. (Tr-26,27). 
3. The arresting officer approached the vehicle and asked 
Appellant-Rascon for his driver's license. The subject did not 
have a license on his person. At that time the officer detected 
the odor of an alcoholic beverage. (Tr-27,29). 
4. Upon request, Appellant-Rascon got out of the car. He 
was unsteady on his feet and several times had to support himself 
against the officer's vehicle. His eyes were bloodshot and his 
speech was "thick". (Tr-29,30). 
5. Thereafter, the officer had Appellant-Rascon perform 
three field sobriety tests (Tr-30-34): a heel-toe test, a finger 
counting test, and an alphabet recitation test. Mr. Rascon 
failed each test; he: (a) had difficulty reciting the alphabet 
from A to Z, forgetting some letters and not completing the 
recitation (Tr-33); (b) he tried the finger counting test, but 
could not count and was unable to coordinate it or finish the 
test (Tr-33); and (c) on attempting the heel-toe test, he was 
unable to perform it without staggering considerably and had to 
sidestep to regain his balance (Tr-33). After the tests were 
performed, the arresting officer placed the Appellant-Rascon 
under arrest for driving while under the influence of alcohol. 
(Tr-36). 
6. Appellant-Rascon was taken to the main police station 
where an intoxilyzer test was administered by an officer duly 
trained in the use of the intoxilyzer machine. (Tr-38, 46-48). 
The test was administered within an hour of the arrest and showed 
a blood alcohol level of .25%. (Tr-52-5-6, Exhibits P-2 and P-5 
following Record-74). 
7. At the police station, prior to the* administration of 
the intoxilyzer test, both the arresting officer and the officer 
who administered the intoxilyzer test examined Appellant-Rasconfs 
mouth. One of the officers shined a flashlight into the mouth, 
and neither officer observed any foreign substances therein. 
(Tr-11,12,45,56 ). Officer Cory Lyman asked Appellant-Rascon if 
he had anything in his mouth; Appellant-Rascon indicated he did 
not. (Tr-46). The officers kept the subject under observation 
for a period of approximately 30 minutes before the test was 
administered. Both observed that Appellant-Rciscon took nothing 
by mouth during that time. (Tr-14,45,56,49). 
8. On August 28, 1987, a hearing was held before the 
Honorable Maurice Jones of the Fifth Circuit Court on a defense 
motion to suppress the results of the intoxilyzer test. 
(Tr-1-18). At that hearing, Appellant-Rascon testified that he 
was wearing dentures on the date he was arrested and that at some 
time prior he had used a type of cream as an adhesive to keep the 
dentures in place. (Tr-1,2). 
9. Appellant-Rascon offered similar testimony regarding 
the dentures and cream during the trial. (Tr-100). At neither 
the suppression hearing nor during the trial did the Appellant 
state how long before his arrest he had applied the denture cream 
nor the type of cream used. He did not deny that he had 
indicated to the officers at the time they inspected his mouth 
that he had nothing in his mouth, nor did he produce any evidence 
to contradict the officers' testimony regarding their inspection 
of his mouth or regarding the thirty minute observation period 
prior to the test. 
10. At the suppression hearing, Mr. Ahmed Tafesh, testi-
fying in behalf of Mr. Rascon, stated that he had read of one 
study which was performed in the State of Colorado in which an 
intoxilyzer test was administered upon a person who had used 
denture cream and which concluded that the test result was 
falsely inflated. (Tr-7-10). Based upon that one study Mr. 
Tafesh expressed the opinion that the results of the intoxilyzer 
test administered upon Appellant-Rascon would have been falsely 
high due to the use of denture cream. (Tr-5,6). Mr. Tafesh 
admitted that he had not performed any such tests regarding 
dentures nor denture cream himself. Further, he did not indicate 
the degree of inflation or express an opinion that Appellant's 
test would have been below the legal limit. (Appellant-Rascon's 
actual test result of .25% was more than three times the 
prohibited .08%. ) 
11. The Colorado study did not identify the number of 
people participating in the study nor did it identify the type of 
cream used. (Tr-6,9,10). The study did not indicate the 
conditions of the subjects at the time of the tests, and it did 
not identify the type of alcohol used. (Tr-16). Further, it did 
not suggest that a denture cream could inflate the alcohol 
results by a magnitude of 300%, as would be required in this 
case. (Tr-16). Rather, the "expert"-Tafesh-admitted he could 
not quantify the degree of inflation. (Tr-6-7). 
12. Following the testimony at the suppression hearing the 
Court denied Appellant-Rascon1s motion to suppress on the grounds 
that Mr. Rascon had failed to meet his burden of establishing 
that the intoxilyzer test results should be suppressed, as a 
matter of law. (Tr-16,17). 
13. A jury trial was held on October 9, 1987. No findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, no written order denying the 
pretrial motion to suppress, and no signed minute entry were ever 
entered into the record. At the time of the introduction by the 
prosecution of the intoxilyzer test results, Appellant-Rascon 
made no objection to the introduction of said evidence. At no 
time during the trial did Appellant-Rascon refer in any way to 
the previous order of denial of the motion to suppress or in any 
way renew that motion. (See entire trial transcript, Tr-19-118). 
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14. During the trial, Mr. Ahmed Tafesh was allowed to 
testify at length in behalf of Appellant-Rascon. (Tr-106-112) . 
The court refused to qualify Mr. Tafesh as an expert, and 
therefore refused to allow him to express an opinion as to the 
effect of the denture cream upon the intoxilyzer test results in 
this case. (Tr-108-109). That refusal was based upon a lack of 
foundation for such an expert opinion, in the following respects: 
(a) Mr. Tafesh had never personally run any blood 
alcohol tests involving the intoxilyzer nor conducted any 
studies regarding the effect of dentures or denture 
fixatives upon intoxilyzer test result (Tr-6,7,125); 
(b) Mr. Tafesh could cite only one study which he had 
read, the results of which were published in Colorado 
(Tr-7-10,16,125); 
(c) That study: 
(1) Did not identify the number of participants 
(Tr-9,16); 
(2) Did not identify the conditions of the 
subjects at the time of the test (Tr-9,16); 
(3) Did not identify the type of cream or 
fixative used (Tr-9,126); 
(4) Did not state a definitive or definite 
variance of the false high reading from the correct 
reading (Tr-9,16); 
(5) Did not indicate when the test was run in 
relation to the consumption (Tr-126); 
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(6) Did not state what type of alcohol was used 
or even if it was an alcoholic beverage (Tr-16,126); 
(7) Did not state whether the particular 
fixative used in the study would absorb alcohol as a 
matter of course, and, if so, to what degree, nor how 
long the residual effect would last. (Tr-126). 
15. Mr. Tafesh was allowed to testify at length at trial 
concerning his education, qualifications and experience, his 
familiarity with the infrared spectrophotometer and the 
intoxilyzer, and concerning a study conducted in Colorado which 
he had read involving the effect of denture cream upon an 
intoxilyzer test. (Tr-106-109). He testified that in that 
particular test the use of a denture cream falsely affected the 
intoxilyzer test result. (Tr-109). 
VI 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Foundational Requirements. 
All foundational requirements for the admission of the 
intoxilyzer test results were met in the instant case. 
Appellant-Rascon failed to show that there was in fact denture 
cream in his mouth at the time of the intoxilyzer test, and he 
failed to lay a proper foundation to challenge the admissibility 
of the test results. 
2. Jury Weighs Evidence. 
The jury was properly allowed to hear and weigh Appellant's 
evidence challenging the credibility of the intoxilyzer test 
results, as an issue of fact. 
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3. Harmless Error, 
Even if the admission of the intoxilyzer results was error, 
it was harmless error in view of the overwhelming additional 
evidence presented at trial indicating Appellantfs guilt. 
4. Appeal Waiver. 
Appellant-Rascon has waived his right to appeal the denial 
of the pretrial suppression motion because no findings or order 




THE FOUNDATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 
ADMISSION OF THE INTOXILYZER RESULTS 
WERE MET IN THIS INSTANCE. 
A. THE SO-CALLED "BAKER RULE" WAS 
ADHERED TO. 
Appellant-Rascon has argued that the results of the breath 
test in this instance should have been suppressed by the court 
because the so-called Baker rule allegedly was not adhered to. 
However, the facts herein indicate that the Baker rule was 
followed in every respect in this case. 
The rule enunciated in State v. Baker, 355 P.2d 806, (a 1960 
Washington case) is that two of the foundational requirements for 
admission of the results of a breath test are that the officer 
administering the test must: (1) examine the subject's mouth to 
verify that the subject had nothing in his mouth at the time of 
the test; and (2) keep the subject under observation for at least 
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fifteen minutes prior to the test to insure that the subject 
takes nothing by mouth during that period. The purpose of the 
fifteen minute observation period is "to allow any alcohol 
present in the mouth to be absorbed in the skin." State v. 
Baker, Id., at 811. 
In Baker, the officer neither examined the subject's mouth 
before giving the test nor kept him under observation for the 
required fifteen minutes. In the instant case, the officer 
examined Appellant-RasconTs mouth prior to the test and found no 
foreign substances therein. (Tr-11,12,45,46,61). Mr. Rascon 
indicated he had nothing in his mouth upon being asked by the 
officer at the time of the examination of th€i mouth. (Tr-45,46). 
The officer kept the subject under observation for the required 
fifteen minute period before administering the test and observed 
that he took nothing by mouth. (Tr-14,45,46). In fact, the 
officer testified that approximately thirty minutes elapsed 
during the observation period prior to the test. (Tr-14). 
Clearly the foundational requirements of the Baker rule were 
met in this instance. 
B. THERE HAS BEEN NO SHOWING THAT THERE 
WAS DENTURE CREAM IN APPELLANT-
RASCON'S MOUTH AT THE TIME OF THE 
TEST. 
Appellant-Rascon?s written pretrial Motion to Suppress dated 
July 27, 1987 argued for suppression of the result of the 
intoxilyzer test on but one ground: that "the defendant had a 
foreign substance in her [sic] mouth at the time the test was 
administered". (Record-14). The Appellant argues that, since he 
had used a cream as a denture fixative at some unspecified time 
prior to his arrest, the presence of the denture cream at the time 
of the test "was established and the intoxilyzer results should 
have been suppressed on this basis alone." (Brief of Appellant at 
p. 4). 
Such reasoning is faulty, since the fact that he may have 
taken such cream earlier does not establish that it was still in 
his mouth at the time of the test. No testimony was presented as 
to how long before the test was administered Appellant-Rascon 
used the cream. No testimony was presented as to how long it 
takes for the particular cream which was used by Rascon to 
dissipate or to be absorbed. The officer testified that he did 
not observe a foreign substance in the defendantf s mouth at the 
time he examined it. (Tr-11,12,45,46). That testimony was 
uncontradicted. There clearly has been no showing by Appellant-
Rascon that there was denture cream in his mouth as the time of 
the test. 
C. THE WQMACK COURT CLARIFIED THE BAKER 
RULE BY RECOGNIZING THAT THE VERY 
PURPOSE FOR THE OBSERVATION PERIOD 
IS TO ALLOW FOR ANY FOREIGN 
SUBSTANCES TO BE ABSORBED. 
In the recent case of Salt Lake City v. Womack, 747 P.2d 
1039 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"In fact, in almost every instance, a breath test 
administered sometime after the traffic stop will be 
advantageous to the D.U.I, suspect in two ways. 
First, a foreign substance present in the mouth which 
might produce an artificially high result will be 
removed by absorption during the observation period. 
Second, in the interval between the traffic stop and 
the breath test, some of the blood alcohol usually 
will have been metabolized, resulting in a slightly 
lower test." Salt Lake City v. Womack, Id., at 1042 
(footnote two). 
Under this ruling, any foreign substance which might have 
been present in defendants mouth, but not observable by the 
officer in his examination of the mouth, which might have 
produced an artificially high result, would have been absorbed 
during the observation period. That is the purpose of the 
waiting period. Neither Baker nor Womack require the officer to 
assure that the subject's mouth is absolutely free of all 
microscopic substances not observable upon reasonable examination 
by the naked eye. Also, in the present case, the observation 
period was at least thirty minutes (Tr-14) which, as stated in 
Womack, would have resulted in an even lower test result. 
POINT II 
EFFECT OF DENTAL CREAM WAS A QUESTION OF 
FACT FOR JURY, DUE TO APPELLANT'S 
FAILURE TO LAY PROPER FOUNDATION 
CHALLENGING ADMISSIBILITY OF TEST. 
A. APPELLANT FAILED TO LAY A PROPER 
FOUNDATION TO CHALLENGE ADMISSI-
BILITY OF INTOXILYZER TEST. 
The only evidence presented by Appellant-Rascon challenging 
the admissibility of the intoxilyzer test results was the 
testimony of Mr. Ahmed Tafesh. The court properly refused to 
qualify Mr. Tafesh as an expert witness to express an opinion 
that the use of denture cream falsely inflated the results of the 
intoxilyzer test. (Tr-108-109). Mr. Rascon failed to lay a 
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proper foundation to challenge the admissibility of the 
intoxilyzer test results in at least the following respects: 
1. Mr. Tafesh had never personally run any blood alcohol 
tests involving the intoxilyzer nor conducted any studies 
regarding the effect of dentures or denture fixatives upon 
intoxilyzer test results (Tr-6,7,125); 
2. Mr. Tafesh could cite only one study which he had 
read, the results of which were published in Colorado (Tr-7-
10,16,125); 
3. That study: 
(a) Did not identify the number of participants (Tr-
9,16); 
(b) Did not identify the conditions of the subjects 
at the time of the test (Tr-9,16); 
(c) Did not identify the type of cream or fixative 
used (Tr-9,126); 
(d) Did not state a definitive or definite variance 
of the false high reading from the correct reading (Tr-
9,16); 
(e) Did not indicate when the test was run in 
relation to the consumption (Tr-126); 
(f) Did not state what type of alcohol was used or 
even if it was an alcoholic beverage (Tr-16,126); and 
(g) Did not state whether the particular fixative 
used in the study would absorb alcohol as a matter of 
course, and, if so, to what degree, nor how long the 
residual effect would last. (Tr-126). 
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Appellant-Rascon had the duty to show that due to the use 
of the denture cream in his case, there was a variance in the 
intoxilyzer test result in excess of 300%. This conclusion is 
true because, to bring the test result of .25% below the .08% 
legal limit, the denture cream effect would of mathematical 
necessity have had to produce such an error. Not only was 
Appellant-Rascon unable to show that there would have been a 
300% variance, but Mr. Ahmed Tafesh acknowledged that he was 
unable to assess what kind of variance might result from the use 
of denture cream. On cross examination at the pretrial 
suppression hearing, the following exchange occurred: 
"Q: And you have not performed any studies in 
regards to dentures, is that correct" 
A: No. 
Q: Nor in regard to denture cream? 
A: No. 
Q: Nor would you be able to assess the kind of 
variance that might result as - because a person 
would have dentures or denture cream? 
A: No. But " . (Tr-6-7). 
B. EVIDENCE REGARDING EFFECT OF DENTAL 
CREAM WAS WEIGHED BY JURY AS AN 
ISSUE OF FACT. 
Under Rule 104, Utah Rules of Evidence, the preliminary 
legal question concerning the qualification of a person to be a 
witness shall be determined by the court, but that rule does not 
limit the right of a party to introduce before the jury evidence 
relative to weight or credibility. Rule 104(a) and (e), Utah 
Rules of Evidence. 
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In the instant case, although the court refused to qualify 
Mr. Ahmed Tafesh as an expert, Mr. Tafesh was nevertheless 
allowed to testify at length during the trial. In fact, Mr. 
Tafeshfs trial testimony was virtually as extensive as his 
testimony at the pretrial hearing, except for the expression of 
his "expert" opinion. (Tr-3-9,106-109).1 Mr. Tafesh testified 
before the jury concerning his education and advanced degrees, 
his qualifications and experience, his familiarity with the 
principles of infrared spectrophotometry, and his studies and 
observations concerning the intoxilyzer instrument. (Tr-106-
108). He testified concerning the study he had read regarding 
the test conducted at the health department in Colorado involving 
the effect of denture cream upon an intoxilyzer test. He 
testified that in that particular test the use of a denture cream 
falsely affected the intoxilyzer test result, although he did not 
state the extent of the variance. (Tr-109). 
The jury was allowed to hear and weigh the testimony of Mr. 
Tafesh in determining the credibility of the results of the 
intoxilyzer test. It was the jury's prerogative to disbelieve or 
to give little weight to Mr. Tafeshfs testimony and, instead, to 
believe, based upon the test results, that Appellant-Rascon's 
Although the court's refusal to allow Mr. Tafesh to express his 
opinion is not an issue on appeal, it should be noted that said 
ruling was proper since he did not qualify as an expert under 
Rule 104, Utah Rules of Evidence. However, if Mr. Tafesh had 
opined, he could only have opined as to the denture cream's 
having an effect on the test results-not as to the degree of 
effect. 
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blood alcohol content was, in fact, in excess of the legal limit 
of .08%. The jury determination of an issue* of fact must be 
sustained in the absence of a showing that the evidence, viewed 
in the light most favorable to the verdict, so clearly 
preponderated in Appellant's favor that reasonable persons could 
not differ on the outcome of the case. Groen v. Tri-0-Inc, 667 
P.2d 598 (Utah 1083); Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170 (Utah 
1983). 
POINT III 
EVEN IF THE INTOXILYZER TEST RESULT WAS 
INADMISSIBLE, ITS ADMISSION WAS HARMLESS 
ERROR UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THIS 
CASE. 
The other evidence in this case of Appellant-Rascon's guilt 
is so overwhelming, that even if the admission of the intoxilyzer 
evidence was error, it was harmless error. The facts which 
support the jury's verdict in this case, in addition to the 
intoxilyzer test results, include the following: 
1. Appellant-Rascon staggered as he walked to his car 
(Tr-25); 
2. As he operated his vehicle he repeatedly weaved into 
another lane of traffic and accelerated very rapidly to speeds in 
excess of the speed limit between semaphore lights (Tr-26,27); 
3. Appellant-Rascon exuded an odor of an alcoholic 
beverage, his eyes were bloodshot, and his speech was "thick" 
(Tr-27,29,30); 
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4. Upon getting out of his vehicle he was unsteady on his 
feet and several times had to support himself against the 
officer's vehicle (Tr-29); 
5. He attempted to perform three field sobriety tests; a 
heel-toe test, a finger counting test, and an alphabet recitation 
test (Tr-30-34). Mr. Rascon failed each test ; he: (a) had 
difficulty reciting the alphabet from A to Z, forgetting some 
letters and not completing the recitation (Tr-33); (b) he tried 
the finger counting test but could not count and was unable to 
coordinate it or finish the test (Tr-33); and (c) on attempting 
the heel-toe test, he was unable to perform it without staggering 
considerably and had to sidestep to regain his balance (Tr-33). 
6. Based upon all of the aforementioned facts and speaking 
as a qualified expert with respect to persons under the influence 
of alcohol, the officer expressed his opinion that at the time he 
stopped Appellant-Rascon1s vehicle Appellant was under the 
influence of alcohol. (Tr-36). 
The law is clear that evidence erroneously admitted at trial 
will be viewed as harmless error where there is no reasonable 
likelihood in the absence of such evidence that there would have 
been a different result. State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 129 
(1986). See also State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (1986); State v. 
Urias, 609 P.2d 1326 (Utah 1980). 
There is such overwhelming additional evidence in the 
instant case to sustain the jury's verdict, that it can be 
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that if the admission of the 
intoxilyzer result was error, such error was harmless. 
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POINT IV 
APPELLANT-RASCON HAS WAIVED RIGHT TO 
RAISE ISSUE ON APPEAL REGARDING DENIAL 
OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
No written findings of fact and conclusions of law, no 
written order, signed minute entry denying Appellant-Rasconfs 
pretrial motion to suppress were entered in the court record 
following the evidentiary hearing. In fact, no such findings or 
order have ever been executed in this matter. 
Appellant failed to renew the motion to suppress at the 
beginning of the trial, made no reference to the prior motion 
during trial, made no objection to the introduction of the 
intoxilyzer results at the time they were proffered, and made no 
motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the prosecution's case nor 
prior to the case going to the jury. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that: 
"[A] specific objection [at trial] is required even 
where a pretrial motion to suppress has been made, 
State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah 1983), because 
?the judge often has a more complete view of the 
evidence and the grounds for its suppression or 
admission than he or she does before trial.1" State 
vs. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 740 (Utah 1985). 
The Appellant-Rascon argues that since there was a full 
pretrial suppression hearing by the same judge which presided at 
the trial in this case, Lesley is inapplicable under the holding 
of State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1987). However, in 
Johnson, in addition to the same judge presiding at the 
suppression hearing and at trial, it was "quite clear from the 
record that defense counsel did not intend to waive any related 
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evidentiary objections at trial." (State v. Johnson, Id., at 
1076. Justice Durham stated in her concurring opinion that: 
"In fact, several ambiguous references during trial 
to a "prior motion" may have referred to defendant's 
pretrial motion to suppress. It is important . . . 
that trial judges be given the opportunity to review 
pretrial suppression rulings when and if they were 
erroneous." State v. Johnson, Id., at 1976. 
Although the same judge presided at the suppression hearing 
and at the trial herein, this case is more analogous to the 
Lesley situation where there were no findings of fact and 
conclusions of law nor written ruling regarding the prior motion. 
The trial in this instance was forty-two days after the 
suppression hearing, and no reference whatsoever was made to the 
suppression motion, until the Appellant filed his brief on 
appeal. 
In addition, counsel for Appellant objected to the 
Respondent's drafting proposed findings in January, 1988, well 
after this appeal was filed. Letter from Larry V. Spendlove to 
the Honorable Maurice Jones dated January 20, 1988 (R-73,74). 
Because of these distinctions, the ruling in Johnson should be 
distinguished and the Appellant should be barred from raising an 
issue which he has heretofore waived. 
CONCLUSION 
The admission at trial of the intoxilyzer test result was 
proper since all foundational requirements were met. The "Baker 
Rule", as clarified by Womack, was adhered to and there was no 
showing that Appellant-Rascon had denture cream in his mouth at 
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the time of the test. The effect of the dental cream was a 
question of fact for the jury, because of Appellant's failure to 
lay a proper foundation challenging the admissibility of the 
test. However, even if the intoxilyzer test result was 
inadmissible, its admission was harmless error in view of the 
overwhelming additional evidence of Appellant-Rascon1s guilt. 
Further, Appellant waived his right to appeal the denial of a 
suppression motion. 
The conviction should be affirmed and remanded for 
execution. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of May, 1988. 
ROGER F. CUTLER 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
LARRY V. SPENDLOVE 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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